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A Comment on the Canadian Constitutional Crisis
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Introduction: Prime Minister Trudeau's Proposals
Canada has never been able to amend its own consti-
tution.l Amendments have to be enacted by the Parliament
of the United Kingdom. This is not the fault of the Old
Country, which would be delighted to relinquish its power
of amendment. It is the fault of Canadian politicians
who, despite intermittent efforts since 1927 and very in-
tensive efforts since 1968, have been unable to agree
upon a domestic amending formula. 2 For Prime Minister
Trudeau, who has held office with only one brief inter-
ruption since 1968,3 constitutional reform has been a
major personal objective. Nevertheless he has not been
able to assemble a package of reforms which would command
the agreement of the ten provincial premiers. 4 The latest
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
1. Certain parts of the constitution can be amended within
Canada. See note 10 infra.
2. There have been some close calls. Agreement was nearly
reached on the so-called Fulton-Favreau formula in 1964, but Quebec
never gave her assent. Agreement seemed to have been reached on the
Victoria Charter formula in 1971, but the agreement was subject to
ratification by each provincial government within 10 days, and Quebec
decided not to ratify it. For a brief account of the search for a
domestic amending formula, see P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada
21-22 (1977).
3. Trudeau is the leader of the Liberal Party. The opposition
Progressive Conservative Party won the general election of 1979, but
the government of Prime Minister Clark lasted less than a year. Its
defeat in Parliament was followed by another general election in 1980,
in which Trudeau was returned to office.
4. Constitutional discussions take the form of meetings between
the Prime Minister and the ten provincial premiers. Each participant
tends to withhold agreement on even uncontroversial matters as a bar-
gaining counter to secure his own particular objectives. Since these
objectives differ widely, even among the provincial premiers, the
assembly of an acceptable package is a formidable task.
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round of constitutional discussions was stimulated by the
Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association which was
defeated on May 20, 1980, by a popular vote of 60 per
cent to 40 per cent. In the referendum campaign, the
federalist forces promised that a "no" to sovereignty-
association was not a vote for the status quo, and that
the defeat of the referendum would be followed by consti-
tutional change to better accommodate Quebec's aspira-
tions. But even this commitment, although shared by the
provincial premiers and the Prime Minister, was not suf-
ficient to secure agreement on specifics at federal-
provincial conferences which lasted through the summer
and early fall of 1980.
Frustrated by the difficulty of obtaining a consen-
sus on the specifics of constitutional reform, Prime
Minister Trudeau has now decided that the federal govern-
ment should proceed "unilaterally" to seek the three
constitutional reforms which he desires most: (1) adop,
tion of a new amending formula which will enable the
constitution to be amended without resort to the United
Kingdom; (2) adoption of a bill of rights which will bind
both the federal Parliament and the provincial legisla-
tures; 5 and (3) relinquishment by the United Kingdom of
its residual power to legislate for Canada. (This last
measure has come to be described as the "patriation" of
the constitution.)
On Monday October 6, these proposals were introduced
into the Canadian House of Commons in the form of a
resolution to be passed by the House of Commons and the
Senate.6 The resolution is in the form of an "address"
to Her Majesty the Queen in the United Kingdom requesting
her to lay before the United Kingdom Parliament the bill
which will accomplish the desired changes in Canada's
5. The Canadian constitution does not include a bill of
rights equivalent to the first ten amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. In 1960 the federal Parliament enacted the
Canadian Bill of Rights, Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix III (1970), but
this took the form of an ordinary statute and is binding only with
regard to federal laws.
6. Proposed resolution for a joint address to Her Majesty the
Queen respecting the constitution of Canada, October 6, 1980.
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constitution. The bill is part of the address. 7
The British North America Act
The federal state of Canada came into being in 1867
when three of the colonies of British North America Cthe
united province of Canada, which divided into Ontario and
Quebec, and the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia) united. These provinces were all British colo-
nies, of course, and the instrument by which their union
was accomplished was an imperial statute, i.e., a statute
enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament for a part of
what was then the British Empire. The statute was called
the British North America Act (the Act), 8 and to this day
it remains the constitution of Canada, which has now
grown to a total of ten provinces and two federal terri-
tories.
The British North America Act is a colonial instru-
ment. Not only were the uniting provinces British colo-
nies, but the new Dominion of Canada became a colony too
subordinate in important respects to the United Kingdom.§
One aspect of that subordination was that the Act could
be amended only in the United Kingdom.10 Unlike the
7. The bill itself is to be called the Canada Act, and it in-
cludes as a schedule the proposed Constitution Act, 1980. The Canada
Act would accomplish the "patriation" of the constitution by a pro-
vision abrogating the power of the United Kingdom Parliament to
make future laws for Canada. The Constitution Act, 1980 would change
the name of the British North America Act, see note 8 infra, to the
Constitution Act, 1867. It includes the new "charter of rights and
freedoms" and the new amending formulas.
8. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.);
Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix II, No. 5 (1970).
9. In international affairs, Canada was considered part of
the British Empire and was fully dependent on the United Kingdom. In
domestic affairs, Canada had a large degree of independence but the
United Kingdom appointed Canada's Governor General, retained the
power to legislate for Canada, and held the power to "disallow" (i.e.
veto) Canadian statutes. Additionally, appeals from Canadian courts
lay to the Privy Council in London.
10. Some parts of the British North America Act can be amended
domestically. Section 92(1) of the Act authorizes each provincial
legislature to amend "the constitution of the province." British
North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 § 92(l)(U.K.); Can. Rev.
Stat., Appendix II, No. 5 (1970). In 1949 a comparable power was con-
ferred, by amendment, on the federal Parliament. British North America
Act (No. 2), (1949),12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 81 (U.K.); Can. Rev. Stat.,
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constitution of the United States, and unlike even the
constitution of Australia--which was also an imperial
statute, but a later one, enacted in 1900--the British
North America Act contained no general provision for
its own amendment. This meant that it could be amended
only by the same body which had enacted it, namely, the
Parliament of the United Kingdom.
The British North America Act was not the only
imperial statute which applied to Canada; there were
many others. For the most part they dealt with trade,
shipping, customs, taxes, and other matters of imperial
concern. These statutes too could not be amended within
Canada. By the 1920's this disability and other vestiges
of colonial status were entirely inappropriate for Canada
and the other "Dominions," as the self-governing members
of the British Empire were then called.HE At "imperial
conferences" attended by the Prime Ministers of the
United Kingdom and the Dominions in 1926 and 1930, it was
resolved to remove the remaining vestiges of Dominion
subordination to the United Kingdom. One result of these
conferences was the passage by the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment of the Statute of Westminster, 1931.12 The Statute
of Westminster, an imperial statute, granted to Canada
(and the other Dominions) the power to repeal or amend
imperial statutes applying to Canada. But, at Canada's
10. (Continued)
Appendix II, No. 31 (1970). Section 91(1) of the Act, as amended,
authorizes the federal Parliament to amend "the constitution of
Canada," a phrase which has been interpreted to refer to matters of
interest only to the federal government. Reference re Legislative
Authority of Parliament to Alter or Replace the Senate, 102 D.L.R.
3d 1 (Can. S. Ct. 1979) (Parliament does not have legislative author-
ity to abolish the federal Senate). Amendments affecting legislative
powers, and other matters of concern to both the federal and provin-
cial governments, may be enacted only by the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment.
11. Nomenclature has been subject to changing fashions. The
term "Dominion" has fallen out of favor since the Second World War
on the ground that it carries a colonial connotation. It has been
replaced by "member of the Commonwealth" as the name for the self-
governing Commonwealth countries. Similarly, "British Empire" has
been superseded by "British Commonwealth" and latterly by plain
"Commonwealth." See K. Wheare, Constitutional Structure of the Com-
monwealth 1-19 (1960).
12. 22 Geo. 5, c. 4 (U.K.); Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix II, No.
26 (1970). The leading work on the legislative history and inter-
pretation of the Statute of Westminster is K. Wheare, The Statute of
Westminster and Dominion Status (5th ed. 1953).
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insistence, the British North America Act was excluded
from this new power, Section 7CI) of the Statute of
Westminster provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment, or alteration
of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or to
any order, rule or regulation made thereunder."13 The
Canadian government favored placing section 711) in the
Statute of Westminster because no one in Canada wanted
the important parts of the British North American Act
to be amendable by an ordinary statute of either the
federal Parliament or the provincial legislatures. The
idea was, and still is, that a constitution should be
more difficult to amend than the Income Tax Act.14
The Present Amending Procedure
After the Statute of Westminster, while other imper-
ial statutes had lost their protected status, the British
North America Act could still be amended only by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom. This did not mean, how-
ever, that the amending process was outside the control
of Canadians. At the imperial conference of 1930 (the
same conference that recommended the enactment of the
Statute of Westminster) it was agreed as a constitutional
"convention"1 5 that the United Kingdom Parliament would
not enact an amendment to the British North America Act
except at the request and with the consent of Canada.16
This convention reflected already longstanding practice.
It has never been departed from.
13. 22 Geo. 5, c. 4 § 7(1) (,K.); Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix I1,
No. 26 (1970).
14. It is doubtful whether section 7(1) was really necessary
to protect the British North America Act from fundamental change. See
K. Wheare, supra note 11, at 69.
15. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
16. This convention is recited in the preamble to the Statute
of Westminster, which states: "It is in accord with the established
constitutional position that no law hereafter made by the Parliament
of the United Kingdom shall extend to any of the said Dominions as
part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the request and
with the consent of that Dominion," 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, preamble (U.K.);
Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix II, No. 26 (1970).
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The convention does not stipulate which governmen-
tal bodies in Canada should make the request for, and
give the consent to, proposed amendments to the Act.
However, long before 1930 the practice had developed in
Canada of requesting amendments by a "joint address" of
the Canadian House of Commons and the Canadian Senate.
The joint address consists of a resolution which re-
quests the United Kingdom government to lay before the
United Kingdom Parliament a bill to accomplish the
desired amendment; the text of the bill is included in
the resolution. If the joint address is passed by both
Houses of the federal Parliament,1 7 it is sent by the
Governor General to the United Kingdom government in
London for enactment. When it has been enacted by the
United Kingdom Parliament the amendment is effective.
This is the procedure which has been set in train by
Prime Minister Trudeau for his current proposals.
The Role of the Provinces
The provinces play no role in the amending process
which has just been described. Moreover, there has been
no consistent practice by the federal government of ob-
taining the consent of the provinces before requesting
an amendment. There have been fifteen important amend-
ments to the British North America Act since its enact-
ment in 1867. Only four of these--in 1940, 1951, 1960,
and 1964--were preceded by the unanimous consent of the
provinces. One other, in 1907, was preceded by the con-
sultation of the provinces CBritish Columbia opposed the
amendment). The remaining ten amendments were requested
by joint address of the federal Parliament and enacted
by the United Kingdom Parliament without prior consul-
tation with the provinces.1 8 The amendments that were
passed without prior consultation included some which
had a significant impact on the interests of the provinces:
for example, the amendment which in 1930 transferred
natural resources from the federal government to the
17. The procedure differs from the enactment of a bill in that
passage of a bill by the two Houses of Parliament would be followed
by the "royal assent" of the Governor General. Only then would the
bill become law.
18. The amendments are listed, with information on provincial
consultation and consent, in B. Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law
33-34 (3d rev. ed. 1969). For fuller accounts of the history of
constitutional amendment in Canada, see P. Gdrin-Lajoie, Constitution-
al Amendment in Canada 47-131 (1950); W. Livingston, Federalism and
Constitutional Change 54-71 (1956).
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prairie provinces 19 (only the recipients agreed) and the
amendment which in 1949 admitted Newfoundland to the con-
federation 2o Conly Newfoundland agreed).
Nevertheless, most of Canada's provincial premiers
are now claiming that Prime Minister Trudeau should not
start the amending procedure until he has obtained the
unanimous consent of the provinces. 2 1  The basis for
their claim is the precedent established by the four
amendments which were preceded by unanimous provincial
consent. Three of these amendments shifted a legislative
power from the provincial legislatures to the federal
Parliament: Cl) unemployment insurance,2 2 2) old age
pensions, 2 3 and (3) supplementary benefits. These
three amendments are the only ones which have altered the
distribution of legislative powers between the federal
Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Since each
amendment had the unanimous consent of the provinces, it
is clear that there has been an invariable practice of
securing provincial consents to amendments altering the
distribution of powers.
Is there any obligation on the federal government to
follow its past practice in the matter of securing provin-
cial consents? The written constitution in Canada is fre-
19. British North America Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 26
(U.K.); Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix II, No. 25 (1970).
20. British North America Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 22
CU.K.); Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix II, No. 30, (1970).
21. The premiers of seven provinces have announced their
opposition to Trudeau's initiative, and their intention to challenge
its legality in court. Proceedings to that end have already been
brought in the provincial court of Manitoba, and will be brought in
Quebec and Newfoundland. See note 34 infra. The Premier of Saskatch-
ewan, while opposed to the federal initiative, has indicated that
he will not join in a court challenge. The Premiers of Ontario and
New Brunswick have indicated support for the federal initiative.
22. British North America Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. 6, c. 36 (U.K.);
Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix II, No. 27 (1970), adding section 91(2A)
to the British North America Act.
23. British North America Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 32
(U.K.); Can. Rev. Stat., Appendix II, No. 33 (1970), adding section
94A to the British North America Act.
24. British North America Act, 1964, c. 73 (U.K.); Can. Rev.
Stat., Appendix II, No. 37 (1970), amending section 94A of the British
North America Act. The fourth amendment, which imposed a retirement
age on judges, is not important to the present discussion. British
North America Act, 1960, 9 Eliz. 2, c. 2(U.K.); Can. Rev. Stat.,
Appendix II, No. 36 (1970), amending section 99 of the British North
America Act.
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quently supplemented by unwritten constitutional "con-
ventions," which prescribe the way in which legal powers
shall be exercised. A constitutional convention becomes
established as the result of, first, longstanding invari-
able practice, and, second, a belief by the officials to
whom it applies that the practice is obligatory.2 5 Whe-
ther a convention requiring provincial consents to amend-
ments altering the distribution of powers has become
established is not entirely clear. The invariable prac-
tice exists, but there have been only three instances of
the practice. 2 6  The position of federal governments may
be inferred from two federal white papers on amendment,
which recognized established practices in making amend-
ments but denied that such practices were obligatory.2 7
The opinions of constitutional lawyers and political
scientists are divided.28
The debate as to whether the federal government must
obtain the consent of the provinces to amendments alter-
ing the distribution of powers is, for most political
scientists and lawyers, a debate about political or moral
25. For a brief discussion of conventions, see P. Hogg, supra
note 2, at 7-11.
26. These may be augmented by negative precedents, that is,
instances where the federal government did not proceed with a pro-
posed amendment because it lacked the consent of all the provinces.
For example, a proposal to widen provincial taxing powers, which was
a companion to the pensions amendment of 1951, note 23 supra, was
abandoned for lack of consent by Quebec and Ontario. See W. Living-
ston, supra note 18, at 67. Other examples are the failures to
proceed with the Fulton-Favreau formula in 1964 and the Victoria
Charter in 1971. See note 2 supra.
27. G. Favreau, The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada 11
(1965) Crules and principles relating to amending procedures "not
constitutionally binding in any strict sense"); M. Lalonde and R.
Basford, The Canadian Constitution and Constitutional Amendment 13
(1978) (government has observed established principles but is "not
constitutionally bound to do so").
28. See P. Ggrin-Lajoie, supra note 18, at 164; W. Livingston,
supra note 18, at 70; Lederman, Constitutional Amendment and Canadian
Unity, in Law Society of Upper Canada, The Constitution and the Future
of Canada 23 (1978) (recognizing existence of convention); R. Dawson,
The Government of Canada 126-27 (5th ed. 1970); J. Mallory, The
Structure of Canadian Government 375 (1971) (denying existence of
convention); B. Laskin, supra note 18, at 32-33; P. Hogg, supra note
2, at 20 (doubtful of existence of convention).
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obligation, not legal obligation. In other words, most
of those who would argue that the federal government is
under an obligation to obtain provincial consents would
concede that this obligation is a "convention" which is
not legally binding. 29 Thus, if the federal Parliament
were to request an amendment in breach of a convention,
the amendment, once enacted, would have to be recognized
as legally effective. Breach of the convention would
give rise to justified political criticism, but would
not invalidate the resulting amendment.
Provincial Consent and Prime Minister Trudeau's Proposals
If there is a convention requiring provincial con-
sents to certain kinds of amendments, does the convention
apply to the Prime Minister's recent proposals? Under
these proposals the amendment to be requested from the
United Kingdom Parliament would revoke the power of the
United Kingdom Parliament to enact future amendments to
the Act Cpatriation), create a new amending formula ena-
bling amendments to be enacted in Canada, and insert a
bill of rights. These proposals differ from the unani-
mous consent amendments of 1940, 1951, and 1964 in that
they do not involve the granting of any new legislative
powers to the federal Parliament. As Prime Minister
Trudeau has emphasized, there is to be no change in the
balance of power between the f6deral Parliament and pro-
vincial legislatures,
However, the proposed amending formula, which would
come into effect after two years, would enable future
amendments to be made with the consent of a stipulated
majority of provinces expressed either by resolutions of
their legislative assemblies or by popular referendum.
A dissenting province could find the constitution amended
without its consent. More significantly, the proposed
bill of rights would limit the powers of the provinces to
take away certain civil liberties. It is true that the
federal Parliament would be equally limited by the pro-
posed bill. It is also true that the purpose of the bill
is to protect individuals' civil liberties rather than to
change the powers of governments. But the fact remains
that the effect of the bill of rights is to cut down pro-
vincial legislative powers. If there is a convention
29. See P. Hogg, suprai note 2, at 7-11 (conventions regulate
working of constitution hut are not enforced by courts).
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requiring provincial consents for some kinds of amend-
ments, the introduction of a bill of rights is, in my
view, one of those kinds of amendments.
If there is a convention requiring prior provincial
consents to the Prime Minister's proposed amendments,
would that convention be observed by the United Kingdom
Parliament? One respected commentator, Professor William
R. Lederman of Queen's University, argues that there is
such a convention, and that it binds the United Kingdom
Parliament as well: "In the face of any provincial dis-
sent, I think the present convention requires that the
British government and the Parliament do nothing, simply
regarding the request from the Canadian Parliament in
these circumstances as improper, that is, unconstitution-
al or illegal. '3 0 It seems more likely, however, that
the United Kingdom Parliament would act automatically on
a joint address of the federal Parliament, and would not
inquire into whether provincial consents should have been
obtained and whether they have been obtained.31 There is
no precedent for such an inquiry, and it would be an
objectionable interference in Canadian domestic affairs.
Therefore, if the federal Parliament passes the joint
address, the likelihood is that the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment will enact the proposed amendment.
Is there any way in which the Prime Minister's pro-
posals can be blocked? There will of course be a stren-
uous political debate on the unilateral aspect of his
action, as well as on the merits of the proposed amending
formula and bill of rights. But it seems unlikely that
this will produce any fundamental change in government
policy, and if it does not the government majorities in
the House of Commons and Senate will ensure its passage.
The Governor General is obliged to follow the advice of
his government, and so the joint address will be trans-
mitted by him to London. For the reasons given above,3 2
the United Kingdom Parliament will then enact the proposed
amendment. Despite the absence of provincial consent, the
amendment will become law.
30. Lederman, The Process of Constitutional Amendment for
Canada, 12 McGill L.J. 371, 379 (1967).
31. See P. Ggrin-Lajoie, supra note 18, at 217 ("The most com-
mon view today is...that British action would be automatic upon a
request from the Canadian Houses of Parliament."). Cf. W. Livingston,
supra note 18, at 81 (precedents unclear but appears United Kingdom
Parliament would act regardless of provincial opposition).
32. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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The foregoing seems to be the most likely scenario.
However, there have been announcements by provincial
premiers of their intention to bring a court challenge
to the federal initiative. 33 As I write one such chal-
lenge has been brought in the Manitoba courts, and pro-
ceedings are planned in Quebec and Newfoundland. Set-
ting aside the procedural difficulties of such proceed-
ings, 34 the substantive problem is: What rule of con-
stitutional law is being violated by the Prime Minister?
Even if there is a convention requiring provincial con-
sents for an amendment of the kind proposed Cand this is
a matter of dispute, as noted above3 5), the orthodox view
is that a convention is not enforceable in the courts. 3 6
On this view the only remedy for breach of a convention
is political: the courts would feel obliged to deny any
legal remedy.
An unorthodox view, but a possible one, envisions
that the courts would recognize the existence of a con-
vention, translate it into a rule of strict constitutional
law, and enforce it. This view is held by Professor
Lederman, who argues that the convention has "crystallized
into constitutional law that should be recognized and en-
forced by the courts."'37 This view has gained credence
from some recent obiter dicta by the Supreme Court of
Canada which seemed to acknowledge the existence of the
convention.38 But the court said nothing about the
33. See note 21 supra.
34. Each provincial government has the power to "refer" a
question to its court of appeal for an advisory opinion. This is the
procedure through which Trudeau's initiative has been challenged in
Manitoba, and it is probable that the same procedure will be employed
in Quebec and Newfoundland. The remaining opposed provinces will
probably intervene in these three courts, whose decisions are appeal-
able to the Supreme Court of Canada. If the reference procedure did
not exist, it would be difficult to determine by what procedure and
at what stage a provincial challenge could be brought.
35. See note 28 supra.
36. See note 29 supra,
37. Minutes of proceedings and evidence of the Special Joint
Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitu-
tion of Canada, 30th Parliament, 3d sess. 5:10 (1977-78) (statement
of William R. Lederman). See aZso Lederman, supra note 28, at 23.
38. Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament to Alter
or Replace the Senate, 102 D.L.R. 3d 1, 7-8 (Can. S. Ct. 1979).
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enforceability of the convention. No Canadian court has
ever enforced a convention. So the success of legal
action must be rated at only an outside chance.
The likelihood is therefore that within a year
Canada will have patriated its constitution, adopted a
new amending formula, and adopted a new bill of rights-,
with or without the consents of its provinces.
